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BOOK REVIEWS
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1956. Edited by G. W. Keeton and G.
Schwarzenberger. London: Stevens & Sons, 1956. Pp. vii, 275. $5.55.
Some little time has passed since Alfred Noyes, in The Barrel Organ,
first called his readers to: "Come down to Kew in lilac-time (It isn't
far from London)."
London will be the setting for the next meeting of the American Bar
Association, and though one may doubt whether lilacs will be in
bloom, members and their families no doubt will rejoice in the chance
to heed the poet's summons.
Vine legal minds also bloom in the ancient capital of the United
Kingdom, in any season. Contact with them likewise will be cause
for rejoicing. To prepare for such amiable concourse, we American
lawyers may profitably turn to a book just received from the publishing firm of Stevens & Sons, Limited, of London.
On behalf of the Faculty of Laws, University College, London,
the book, trder the title Current Legal Problems 1956, presents the
public lectures delivered during the Michaelmas and spring terms of
the College Session of 1955-1956 by members of its Faculty of Laws,
and also an address to The Bentham Club by its President, Sir Patrick
Devlin.
Bentham, of course, is the Jeremy Bentham. He assisted in founding the University College, and after he died, by direction of his will,
his bones were assembled and made the frame of a clothed likeness
set up in a glass cabinet somewhat like the corpse of Stalin in Moscow,
but sitting up. As fascinating as is the lore of the Bentham name, it is
quite beyond the scope of this review.
What first impresses the American reader of the lectures is the
similarity of the problems considered important to the London University Faculty in relation to our current legal problems here. Thus
the recession of the influence of the common law which is the subjectmatter of Sir Patrick Devlin's discourse "The Common Law, Public
Policy and the Executive" is reminiscent of our own experience here
with the ever expanding jurisdiction of administrative agencies. This
trend needs close watching by all lawyers, and in fact by all citizens,
if the ideal of independence and the separation of powers is to be
maintained unimpaired. What part did Bentham's ideas play in this?
One pauses to wonder at the irony.
So too, more and more of our law schools here are emphasizing
the study of comparative law. What then could be more appropriate
than a review of Professor Raphael Powell's lecture on "Good Faith
626
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in Contracts" in which he traces that subject from the Roman notion
of bona fides through the canon law to the English law which he then
compares with the Scot's law and the French and German Law.
Likewise, the question of "How High is Up" is one which has been
occupying the attention of our aeronautical experts, who should find
B. Cheng's observations in "Recent Developments in Air Law" of
more than passing interest. Professor Cheng, in suggesting that the
peregrinations of future Buck Rogerses may encounter not a few
legal complications, cites many American authorities.
American authorities are reviewed, too, in "Obscenity and the Law,"
by D. Lloyd, M.A., LL.B., Quain Professor of Jurisprudence in the
University, and in "The Control of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices" by Mrs. Valentine Lathan Korah, LL.M.
A parallel with the Hawaiian question now vexing our Congress
is suggested in the essay, "The Constitutional Future of Malta" by
Professor R. C. Fitzgerald, LL.B., F.R.S.A., Professor of English Law
and Dean of the Faculty of Laws. Of course, Hawaii is not mentioned
in this paper but the situation of Hawaii vis-a-vis the mainland of the
United States somewhat resembles that of Malta with respect to
the British Isles, and there is a similarity of aspiration
Of the other lectures, the student of law in particular may receive
considerable enlightenment on what is meant by the phrase "public
policy" by reading "The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes," the sixth lecture of the series, on page 96,
by D. J. Payne, LL.B. Citing frequently the work originally prepared by P. B. Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes," (10th ed.
1953), Mr. Payne indicates how judges must "make law" in applying
statutes to cases unforeseen by the legislature, and advances the
idea that a delegation of such power by legislatures to the courts be
frankly recognized. It is an interesting theory.
All the lectures carry the quality of the limpid, fluid, British style
of expression. Excepting possibly the last lecture "The Province of
the Doctrine of International Law," by G. Schwarzenberger, Ph.D.,
Dr.Jur., they are all easy to read. It seems that abstruseness is too
intrinsic in the subject of international law to be overcome by any style
of writing. The gist of this lecture, however, so far as I am able to
perceive, is that it is time in international law to call a spade a spade,
diplomatically of course,-to recognize the element of military force
in international affairs for what it is, and to deal with it accordingly.
One observation pertinent to many branches of law appears on page
242 relating to "Balancing of Interests":
The process of balancing conflicting rules, which itself has an inevitable
element of subjectivity, however strongly controlled, would be transformed
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into a still less verifiable juggling game with maxims on a level of subjectivity unlimited.
Here, the phrase "subjectivity unlimited" somehow strikes a familiar
responsive chord.
If space allowed, food for comment could be found in all of the
lectures not mentioned:
"Gifts in Favour of Sport and Recreation" by 0. R. Marshall, M.A., Ph.D.
"Mens Rea and Vicarious Responsibility" by Glanfille Williams, M.A.,
LL.D., Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. (This discusses criminal
liability of owners of motor vehicles, amongst other matters).
"Revision of the Sale of Goods Act" by E.R.H. Ivamy, Ph.D. (To be noted
for its discussion of international sales).
"Security of Tenure Under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954" by E. H.
Scamell, LL.M.
"Freedom of the Press in the Commonwealth" by D. C. Holland, M.A.
The last mentioned lecture offers some ground for supposing that
the press in some parts of the Empire is not as free as it might beshades of Milton's Areopagitica!
All in all, these lectures are addressed to the philosophers at the
bar and are not intended for the everyday busy practitioner.
DAVID F. MAXWELL*

SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LITIGATION. By Edmund Morris Morgan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 195. $3.50.
Columbia has earned the gratitude of lawyers interested in trials
and the process of proof by inviting Edmund M. Morgan to deliver
these lectures and by publishing them in this little book.
Morgan, always a bonny fighter, here gives again his reasons for the
faith that is in him on some of the issues on which he has entered the
lists aforetime. Thus, he doughtily defends the thesis-a most sensible
one, I think-that when a judge (after notice to the adversary when
appropriate) has finally determined to take judicial notice of a fact,
the fact is settled for that trial and the adversary may not contest it
with contrary evidence. Again, he challenges once more, as applied
to the hearsay rule, the thesis of Thayer and Wigmore that the law of
evidence is the child of the jury system. He assembles the expressions
of the judges and textwriters in the period when the hearsay rule was
a-borning, to show that they gave, not distrust of the jury, but the
*President, American Bar Association; Member, Edmonds, Obermyer, &
Rebmann, Philadelphia, Pa.
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probative weakness of hearsay, due to the lack of oath and crossexamination, as their reason for rejecting it. This is persuasive but
not conclusive. Sometimes reasons may be strong which are not
spoken. May we not say that the weakness of hearsay would inevitably
be appraised by common law judges in the setting of the untrained
body who were to hear it? Finally, he recalls the position formerly
espoused by Wigmore that the admission of a party out of court could
be received only as a kind of impeachment of his present position and
not as substantive evidence of the facts admitted. Morgan demonstrates the unsoundness of this and makes clear that extra-judicial
admissions are accepted by the courts for the truth of the statements
contained in them and come then within the definition of hearsay,, and
thus are received under an exception to the hearsay rule.
But he does much more than re-fight these battles. In his first lecture
he tells the fascinating story of the struggle of English and American
courts to shape a system of pleading which will define the area of
dispute, so that the trial will be confined within manageable compass,
and which will reliably guide the lawyer in assembling his proofs and
preparing for trial. At one stage, about the time of Henry II and during
the Year Books era the effective part of the pleading stage consisted
of an oral interchange between court and counsel, not unlike the modern pre-trial conference. This vivid description bears quotation:
"....

the proceedings by which the parties, their pleaders or counsel,

and the court evolved the precise issue for trial and the phrasing in
which it was to be enrolled were informal in the extreme. Thus: The
pleader makes his statement of claim or defense. The opponent
thinking it insufficient interposes, 'Judgment of that.' The court may
turn to the pleader and demand, 'Say something else,' or reply to the
objector, 'Say something.' Or there may be a debate between counsel
or between counsel and court. Biting remarks by the court, sometimes
punctuated by profanity, are not uncommon. Counsel, before accepting the court's intimation that his pleading is insufficient or that he
must respond to the opponent, may ask time to consult and advise
his client. Occasionally in complying he may remark that had the
client followed his advice, he would have stood upon his original
position. When the substance of the opposing statements has been
agreed upon, the language in which they shall be enrolled has to be
determined." (pp. 9-10).
Next, apparently, came an era when the court-counsel-conference
method of settling the pleadings lapsed-a backward step-and the
parties had the responsibility for drafting written pleadings so circumscribed that the issues were few and simple. At this stage, "preparation for trial remained a comparatively simple matter and the task of
the jury relatively easy to perform." (p. 22).
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Then came an era, beginning about 1700, of piecemeal liberalizations
of pleading. Among these changes: permitting the plaintiff to join as
many causes of action as he liked, if remediable in the same form of
action, and this permission was expanded by permitting him to state
a single cause of action in as many "counts" or different versions as he
thought might be needed to meet the possible alternative facts that
the proofs might disclose; a similar extension of the defendant's rights,
given by the Statute of Ann of 1705, permitting the defendant to interpose as many pleas to the merits as he might have; the widening of
proveable defences under the general issue; and finally the invention
of general assumpsit as a wholesale remedy for money due. But to
liberalize is not always to reform. As the author says:

".

. . on the

whole the system of common-law pleading which the judges and lawyers developed defeated the very purpose which it should have served.
it had become an art requiring infinite care as to form and encouraging
subtlety of scholastic reasoning, but affording neither court nor parties
notice as to the issues of fact which would be the subject of proof at
the trial.... Adequate preparation for trial required the investigation
of all materials relevant to any state of facts which a lively legal
imagination could conceive as possibly relevant under each of a series
of issues. To call such pleading issue pleading was to ignore actualities.
It was a far cry indeed from the simplicity of issue and disclosure in
advance of trial of the real area of dispute which prevailed in the
clays of oral pleading." (p. 24).
Then in the middle 1800's came the Hilary Rules, the half-hearted
and self-defeating effort of the English judges to reform the system
of pleading. "Before [the Rules] went into effect one case in six turned
on the pleadings without regard to the merits, under their influence,
one in four." (pp. 24,25).
This failure of the judges prompted the American reformers to turn
to the legislature and thus was born the Field Code, with its abolition
of forms of action and its requirement that only facts shall be pleaded.
It has likewise been a failure. "The original Field Code contained 391
sections; by 1919 it had grown to more than 3,400 sections. It used to be
said that the average lawyer learned it at $10.00 a section-the cost of
permission to amend. Charles Boston at one time estimated that one
third of the time of the New York courts was consumed in deciding
mere matters of procedure.... But my fundamental objection to the
typical code is that a party can comply with its terms and keep hidden
his real ground of attack or defense. In this way he can put his opponent to needless expense involved in preparation to meet issues that
will not actually be litigated.... Had the lawyers and judges received
the code with a determination to make it produce the result that the
codifiers had intended, it would doubtless have given us a simplified

1957 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

procedure by which controversies could be adjusted with reasonable
speed and without undue expense. But they were unwilling or unable
to do so." (pp. 2627).
Against this background of failure the author sketches the system
established by the Federal Rules. Here the effort to force the party to
show his hand in his pleadings is abandoned. General statements are
permitted and the opportunity for attack on the pleadings is restricted.
Information as to the adversary's contentions and the evidence which
the party will have to meet is to be secured not mainly from the pleadings, but chiefly through the use of the liberalized provisions for discovery and pre-trial hearings. "The first step toward making a
lawsuit a rational proceeding for discovering the factual basis of a
controversy is acceptance of these provisions of the Federal Rules.
The next is a complete renovation of the rules of evidence." (p. 35).
The lecture on Functions of Judge and Jury discusses and brings
light to two distinct but related topics. First comes a clear exposition
of the allocation and operation of the two burdens collectively known
as the burden of proof, namely the burden of producing evidence of
a fact and the burden of persuasion, together with a description of
the effect of presumptions upon each of these burdens. In addition, it
treats of the responsibility of the judge to decide preliminary questions of fact upon which the admissibility of challenged evidence depends, the inroads which have been made upon that responsibility,
and the consequent dangers to the policy upon which the particular
rule of exclusion is based. He gives as an extreme example of such
danger the practice which prevails in New York and some other states
of admitting before the jury a confession, where there is conflicting
evidence as to its voluntariness, with instructions to disregard if they
find it involuntary. 1 In closing the chapter, he says: "The conclusion
of this whole matter is that in the administration of trial by jury we
deprive jurors of the effective assistance of the judge in the very
situations where it is most needed. It is time that we ceased our inconsistent attitudes towards them-treating them at times as a group
of low-grade morons and at other times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control their emotions and intellects." (p. 105).
The last three lectures deal with the hearsay rule, its history, theory
and practice and its operation in conjunction with other exclusionary
rules. The author demonstrates that the requirements of the established exceptions do not provide adequate equivalents in trustworthiness for the oath and cross-examination. He devises elaborate supposed
cases showing that the hearsay rule, its exceptions, and its sister rules
of exclusion may often operate to let in the least reliable and exclude
the most trustworthy types of hearsay. He makes this trenchant com1. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953).
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ment: "I realize that the Bar, and perhaps the Bench, are not prepared
for radical reform which would make admissible all hearsay that a
court considers as having appreciable value. Experience with the
Model Code of the American Law Institute is conclusive on that. The
Uniform Rules of Evidence, lately approved by the Institute and by
the American Bar Association are much less radical. Their adoption
would make the rules governing hearsay reflect in general the reasons
which appear to govern the current attitude of the more liberal courts.
They call for serious consideration by the profession, if we really want
to make a trial a rational proceeding for the discovery of the facts
affecting the rights and duties of the litigants. Will the usual inertia
of the Bar make them only another neglected proposal of so-called
dreamers?" (p. 168).
I do not apologize for my lavish use of quotations in this review.
Many thousands of students at many schools and many thousands of
lawyers and law teachers at professional meetings have listened with
admiration and delight to Morgan's exposition of what the rules of
evidence and procedure are and what they ought to be. Any of
them who read these quoted passages will see again the tough wiry
figure, the-heart-warming smile, hear again the cadences of that reedy,
resonant voice, denouncing false idols. And they will say again,
"there is a man."
CHARLES

T.

MCCORMICK*

By Milton
N. Lieberman. Newark: Gann Law Books, 1956. Pp. viii, 974.

EFFECTIVE DRAFTING OF LEASES WITH CHECK LIST AND FORMS.

This book is a comprehensive check list with comments, suggested
forms, and index. Its primary purpose is "to provide the lawyer with
that peace of mind which comes when he feels confident that he has
completely covered all those matters which he might otherwise have
overlooked, in drafting or examining" a regular commercial lease of
land upon which a substantial building has been erected or will be
erected.
The check list consists of 472 items. Each item includes a question
and comment. Many items also include one or more suggested forms
which often contain possible solutions to problems raised in the comment. The questions and comments have been very carefully written
and for this reason they should be very useful.
Of the 472 items, 14 relate to agreements to lease or options to lease,
17 to income tax considerations, and 15 to certain special purpose
leases. Of the 15 items on special purpose leases, seven relate to spe*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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cial purpose leases which are similar to regular commercial leasesfor example, theatre leases, factory or mill leases, shopping-center
leases. Six of these 15 items relate to special purpose leases which are
not similar to regular commercial leases-for example, oil and gas
leases, farm leases, billboard and signboard leases.
Mr. Lieberman in his comments on billboard and signboard leases
neglects to warn lawyers that "leases" of this type may be grants of
easements and therefore the usual principles of landlord and tenant
law would not be applicable. In general the comments to each of the
questions which relate to special purpose leases consist of statements
of the more important matters which a lawyer should consider and
a warning that the book is not intended to be a comprehensive check
list for the drafting of these and other special purpose leases. Consequently, the lawyer who is drafting a farm lease will wish that more
material on farm leases had been included in the book; the lawyer who
is drafting shopping-center leases will wish that more material on his
specific problems had been included. As between these two lawyers,
the one who is drafting a modern farm lease is in a slightly better
position, because Mr. Lieberman had made an exception to his general
practice of not citing cases, texts, articles, or pamphlets in his comments and has cited the pamphlet Better Farm Leases with the suggestion that it be examined for special points
Mr. Lieberman's decision not to cite cases nor to discuss directly the
law of landlord and tenant is understandable and proper. But, in view
of the fact that many of his comments to the questions of the check
list are necessarily suggestions as to points which should be considered, many lawyers would probably appreciate citations to specific
texts, articles, and pamphlets where these specific points are discussed
more fully. The citations should include materials prepared for
realtors as well as materials prepared for lawyers, because many of
the provisions which are included or are intentionally omitted from a
lease involve the so-called practical aspects of leasing and not legal
principles.
The appendix of the book consists of about 150 pages. It contains
four sample leases, guaranty, tenant's assignment, acceptance by assignee, landlord's consent to assignment, landlord's assignment, and
various forms of acknowledgments; a list of the 472 questions for quick
reference; suggestions as to preparation for closing; and a short "Bibliography of Forms" which includes texts as well as form books.
There is a general index of 82 pages and an index to suggested
forms of 55 pages. Both of these indexes have been carefully prepared
to enable the lawyer to find quickly a specific point. Through the
index to the suggested forms, a lawyer may find one or more suggested
forms which are pertinent to his specific problem. Unfortunately,
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some of the suggested forms which were copied from form books or
leases, are poorly drafted. Also, the suggested forms have not been
edited and therefore vary as to style, quality, and the meaning of some
of the words used in them.
Time limitations often determine the quality of portions of many
very useful law books. It would have required a great deal of time
for Mr. Lieberman or any other qualified person to edit all the suggested forms so that they would meet the standards of modern legal
drafting and be uniform in style so that a lawyer could easily fit them
together into a modern lease. As a simple illustration, some of the
suggested forms use the terms "lessor" and "lessee"; others use "landlord" and "tenant." In a book on the effective drafting of leases the
desirability of the terms "landlord" and "tenant" should be recognized
because they are more easily understood by landlords and tenants who
must carry out the terms of their leases. Also, when typing the terms
"lessor" and "lessee," typists at times have mistakenly typed "lessee"
for "lessor" and vice versa.
The following simple illustration of Mr. Lieberman's failure to give
proper attention to the suggested forms in his book appears at page 3:
II-1, Are the full names of all the parties inserted and correctly spelled?
COMMENT

To avoid any future question as to the identification of the parties ...
the full names of all the parties should be inserted....
SUGGESTED FORM

This lease made the 10th day of January, 1956, between John J. Doe,
unmarried, son of John A. Doe and Mary Doe, of 215 A Street, in the City
of ....
In addition to the failure to use the landlord's full name, the address
is so placed as to create an ambiguity. Is it the address of the landlord
or of his parents?
If all lawyers would consistently use the full names of parties to
legal documents, particularly documents which are recorded or are
necessary to determine rights with respect to property, the time required for searching records would be substantially reduced. If full
names and an electronic device were used the time required for a
title search would be reduced from days, weeks, and months to minutes.
On page six of the book in two different suggested forms the name of
the landlord is given as "John Doe" in one form and as "John Jones"
in another form. Is a lawyer who uses this book more likely to follow
the principle of using full names which is set forth in the comment of
Item II,1 or the suggested forms which do not follow this principle?
Effective Drafting of Leases with Check List and Forms is a very
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worthWhile book, but it will not be the last material which a lawyer
will buy to assist him in the drafting of leases.
RO3ERT N. CooK*

THE LAW AND ONE MAN AMONG MANY. By Arthur E. Sutherland.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Pp. ix, 101. $2.50.
The central problem with which The Law and One Man Among
Many is concerned is the relation of individual man to collective man
in our highly organized twentieth century society. This calls for a
re-examination of the fundamentals of human freedom under law in
our own time. Particular attention is devoted to the complex interplay
of competing and conflicting freedoms and restraints which are fixed
by a wide variety of controlling pressures upon the individual. Professor Sutherland concludes that man's freedom is the mathematical
sum of all the multiple helps and hindrances supplied or imposed by
his natural, his private, and his civic surroundings. The extent to
which our courts take cognizance of these respective helps atd hindrances in the settlement of controversies between individuals, or
between individual man and the group, and the perception of justice
in the treatment thus afforded, is the subject of detailed inquiry.
This slender volume of one hundred pages derives from Professor
Sutherland's preparation and delivery of the Rundell Lectures at the
University of Wisconsin Law School. As the author so readily concedes, on this subject there has been no end of the making of many
books by many philosophers. But any lack of novelty which may attach
to the subject matter is outgained by the insights he brings to bear
upon the problem, which is of such persistent interest to all students
of the administration of justice. The author combines clarity of style
with an interesting array of legal and non-legal source materials,
and avoids the ponderousness and pomposity which mark so many
inquiries in this complex and difficult field.
In format, the book falls into the three-part pattern which a series
of three separate but related lectures would naturally impose. Despite
this forced episodic quality, the author achieves continuity and a high
degree of integration through the medium of periodic restatements of
position and purpose, and the use of a brief epilogue.
Under the sub-title "Fashions in Individualism," the first part of
the book is given over to consideration of the meaning of freedom as
applied to the individual in his relation to the many. The several
political, economic and cultural connotations of "individualism" are
-developed by liberal quotation from a sampling of savants and special
*Ptofessor of Law, Western Reserve University.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

pleaders, past and present. Periodically changing styles which affect
the use of words like individualism and collectivism in describing
opposite social philosophies are graphically illustrated. The alternate
triumph or rejection of these terms in the legal order, when freedom
of the individual is at stake, calls for something more precise in the
way of helpful definition. Accordingly, Professor Sutherland chooses
to define "individualism" as a belief in the desirability of man's being
left to do as he pleases, so long as he does not too shockingly interfere
with somebody else's doing the same. This definition subsumes that
the most desirable objective for a society to achieve is the greatest
possible average individual freedom for the members of that society.
It follows, then, that the great problem of our society is to decide what
limits collective man will put on the individual's acting to please himself.
Under the sub-title "Freedom Added and Subtracted" the second
part of the book is devoted to examination of a variety of decided cases
wherein our courts have appeared to add and subtract the elements
of freedom to which individuals have laid competing claim, either
against the crowd, or against other individuals with inconsistent freedoms of their own to maintain. The difficulty of the judge, who must
find merit in the conflicting desires of individuals or of groups, is
readily apparent in cases involving competing evangelical factions,
racial groups, occupiers of land, and government security risks.
Under the sub-title "Perception of Justice," the final section of the
book deals with man's aspiration for justice, of his past and current
attempts to find standards of guidance for the administration of justice
in an increasingly complex and crowded world. Many of our familiar
conceptions of justice are tested, and rejected as furnishing any singly
acceptable criteria. The majority will is hard to ascertain and productive of error. Justice as defined in the ancient word is entitled to
respect, but often confronts us with an orthodoxy outworn, while
divine law presents its own peculiar problems of discernment. Justice
as that which brings happiness to the greatest number is of small aid
in the generality of cases, where the problem is not to decide which of
several benefits people ought to want, but to allocate between rival
aspirants the very thing they do want. Natural law with its claimed
universality of application, unchanging and everlasting, has its own
difficulties of definition but, as the author notes has had something of
a revival in our times. In fact, he performs the rather improbable feat
of lining up Blackstone the religionist and Holmes the skeptic under
the aegis of the law of nature. This is possible, of course, only by the
most expanded definition of the doctrine.
In summary, the author concludes that governing indeed represents
a series of choices, and that all men are not governed alike. In this
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exercise of discriminatory choice we are able to perceive something
of the nature of Justice. But as to what justice is, we are forced to
join with Plato in his ancient confession of failure: "for I know not
what Justice is." However, the business of governing goes on, as it
must if we are to survive, and the choices made will be found to rest
upon application of multiple criteria, a blend of motives, and a mixture
of political theory.
It seems to me that the difficulties which beset the reviewer of a
book are often in inverse ratio to the size of the book, itself. Particularly, where the book is concerned with a theme which has confounded
thoughtful men of all the Ages. Professor Sutherland does not appear
in the least hampered by the page limitation of The Law and One Man
Among Many. From the outset, he manages the impression that he has
something important to say, and proceeds to say it with a refreshing
display of modesty and sincerity. With so much in the book to appreciate and applaud, it is difficult to come to grips with evaluation of its
central theme, and the extent to which the author has accomplished
what he set out to do. It is obviously unfair to criticize a writer because he wrotethe book he did, in place of one he did not. But at least
a partial objection along these lines seems valid. After its impressive
statement of position, and brilliant exposition of man's unswerving
attempts to find standards which will parallel his aspirations for justice, the conclusions finally drawn are indeed anti-climactic. Perhaps
it is just a case of the author's having raised our hopes too high, but
it comes as neither news nor comfort that "we know not what Justice
is," and that the choices which affect man's freedom always rest upon
multiple criteria, each having some value, and a blend of motives, and
a mixture of political theory.
Some readers may be less troubled by the relative inconclusiveness
of the author's summation, than by certain of his primary assumptions
upon which the entire structure depends. His definition of freedom as
the mathematical sum of all the multiple helps and hindrances supplied or imposed by man's natural, private, and civic surroundings
seems to be no more than a restatement of pluralism, broadened perhaps to include environmental "sovereignties," along with those of
private or occupational groups in the modern community, intermediate
between the individual and the state. The validity or invalidity of the
doctrine of pluralism is unaffected by its being recast into the form of
an algebraic equation. A more pertinent objection to the definition of
freedom herein is that it contemplates freedom as a goal, rather than
a method. As a method, freedom may be related to the value of human
life in much the same sense that the army is related to national security, or commerce to wealth, or due process to the decided case. When
viewed as a datum which may be extracted by simple arithmetic, free-
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dom loses its deeper meaning and is effectively split off from its functioil.
Professor Sutherland also defines "individualism" as a belief in the
desirability of a man's being left to do as he pleases, so long as he does
not too shockingly interfere with somebody else's doing the same.
This definition he ties in with the stated assumption that the most
desirable objective of society to achieve is the greatest possible average
of individual freedom for the members of that society. It is not clear,
nor perhaps important to this discussion, whether these are statements
of preferred position, or whether the author is merely reading the
minutes of the last meeting and noting current acceptance of these
points of view.
The troubling effect of these definitions is not limited to such obvious unanswered questions, as what do you mean by "as he pleases"?
Is the action or inaction thus enabled that which does please him, or
that which he believes pleasing, or will it be limited to that which
would and should please him, if he were reasonably average in his
desires and capacity for appreciation? The difficulty runs deeper. If
taken at face value, this elevation of the individual conscience to the
role of court of last resort (limited only by the competition of the
conscience or desire mechanism of other men or groups) sounds like a
jurisprudential accommodation worked out between Austin and
Thoreau. it must be conceded that modern man is the inheritor of an
orthodoxy which consists in holding that the universe only exists and
is governed for the sake of mankind, or, as it is sometimes more palatably put, for the spirit of man. But from this persuasion, it would
seem a fateful, though beguiling, step to cast man in a new juristic
image: a man without moral commitment to others, or to life; to each,
himself.
Summing up: a tremendously provocative book which merits careful reading by all those who claim an interest in the law.
IXENMTH B. HUGHPS*
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. By Edward Ross Aranow

and Herbert A. Einhorn. New York: Columbia University Press,
1957. Pp. xxiii, 577. $15.00
Anyone engaged in or contemplating participation in a proxy contest should have this volume under his arm, not on his desk. It is
a practical handbook describing the step by step battle of a contest
for corporate control. It is documented by illustrations from well
known proxy contests of recent years and a full citation of authori-

ties.
*Professor of Law, B3oston UniVetsity.
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The informal procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission's staff in processing proxy statements and material is explained
commencing at page 121. This reviewer does not know the authors
personally but it is obvious that they, like he, learned this heretofore
unpublished information in the school of hard experience. The
authors know whereof they write. If the book had been published
earlier it would have saved this reviewer many hours of labor and
research.
Parts I to V give the problems-and most of the answers-from
the time the idea of a contest begins to take form down through the
solicitation of proxies, conduct of stockholders meeting, judicial remedies, and the expenses involved. Each topic is discussed from the
management and then from the insurgent viewpoint. This is true
whether the question be that of starting a contest or of management's
right to use corporate funds in the contest and insurgent's reimbursement from such funds.
The statutes of the principal states and the leading cases under
them are analyzed. The well publicized contests are subjected to an
interesting analysis for purpose of illustration and to indicate their
effect in developing the law pertaining to what constitutes proxy
soliciting material, to "staggered" boards, to cumulative voting and
other topics. Peculiarities of the corporation statutes in various states
which may cause a result different from the leading cases on the same
point in another jurisdiction are noted.
A lawyer who reads this book may feel that in some respects treatment has been too elementary. He may skip the pages in Chapter
3 dealing with the difference between a record date and a closing of
stock transfer books. He may not care that the going rate charged by
stock exchange members for obtaining a customer's instruction on
how to mark a proxy for his "Street Name" stock is 30 (p. 226) or
the reminder on page 335 that "Paper clips, rubber bands, writing
pads, pencils and similar items are always needed" when you count
the proxies.
But then, the authors aim their book at corporate executives, proxy
solicitors, security analysts, accountants and public relations experts
as well as lawyers. The story of a proxy contest is all here.
JESS HALSTED*

*Member, MacLeish, Spray, Price & Underwood, Chicago, Illinois.
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GIBsoN's Surrs n CHANcERY. By Arthur Crownover, Jr. Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1955-1956. Vol. I, Pp. xxiii, 909; Vol. II,
Pp. xv, 949. $45.00.
Although Chancery originated with the King's conscience, in many
instances it has become the lawyer's headache. Particularly is this true
in states like our own where the original distinction between courts
of law and equity is preserved, and the early formalities and jurisdictional distinctions peculiar to chancery procedure are to a large extent maintained. To this condition a useful antidote since 1891 has
been Gibson's Suits in Chancery, a new edition of which has just been
published.
I have had occasion to note before that we in Tennessee are particularly fortunate in the availability of outstanding texts dealing with
all phases of our local practice. Caruther'sHistory of a Lawsuit and
Pritchardon Wills do for law and probate practice what Chancellor
Gibson's treatise does for equity. Now with this new edition, the first
in eighteen years, we can add to our blessings that all three of these
useful aids to Tennessee lawyers have been revised within the past
half dozen years, and thus we have not only the best but the most
modern tools with which to practice our profession.
The present editor is by no means a newcomer to the field, for
he collaborated with Judge Higgins on the edition just prior to
this one. The editorial work has been immense, and it is no surprise
to learn from the preface that it required more than eight years.
Much new material has been added, and the chapters on Jurisdiction,
Parties, Process, Pleadings, Evidence, Hearings, Specific Remedies,
and Appellate Procedure have either been completely rewritten or
greatly amended. The numerous equity cases decided by Courts of
Appeals in this state since the last edition have been collected and
collated, and citations to them as well as to the earlier decisions have
been provided references to the Tennessee Reports by volume number
rather than by the name of the reporter. References to decisions citing earlier editions of this work have also been provided under the
appropriate section numbers. Code sections given are those of the new
1956 Code as well as the earlier one of 1932. Virtually all of the footnotes have been rewritten or supplemented, and many new ones provided. Although preserving all of the virtues and even much of the
flavor (the Latin maxims have been retained, but English translations
are also given) of Chancellor Gibson's text, this is in many respects an
entirely new work.
The format has also been considerably improved. In addition to the
usual general index and index of forms, a key to the Latin maxims
has been provided, as well as a parallel reference table to the fourth
edition. And by no means the least significant contribution which
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the publishers have made to the usability of this edition is the breaking down of the text into two volumes, thus permitting the employment of a type considerably larger and more readable than that which
placed users of earlier editions in constant danger of myopia.
Chancellor Gibson's thesis, maintained by his present editor, is
that "The evolution of the law in England and in America has been
on lines marked out by Equity." In the disappearance in many states
and in the Federal system of the ancient distinction between courts
of equity and law he sees not an abandonment of equitable principles
but an absorption by them of the more rigid rules of law; and even
in modern pleading he sees a wider application of equity procedures.
His statement on this point, which remains unchanged from earlier editions, sounds almost petulant:
There is an opinion, somewhat prevalent, that there is no Equity jurisprudence in those States of the Union which have abolished Chancery
Courts. This is a gross misconception. The doctrines, principles and remedies of the Chancery Court are in full force in every State; and while, in
many of the States, there are no separate Chancery Courts, in all of them
the jurisprudence of Equity is, nevertheless, recognized and administered
as fully as though special courts of Equity were in existence. In those
states that have adopted the 'code practice' or 'reformed procedure,' as it
is variously termed, instead of the principles, pleadings, practice and
remedies of the Chancery Court being abolished, in fact the common law
practice, pleadings and remedies have been abolished, or greatly conformed to those of Chancery.
Even in the most recent and sweeping procedural reform in courts
familiar to all of us, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present editor sees a capitulation to equitable principles; for to
Chancellor Gibson's original statement he has found it necessary
to add only a single clause:
And in the Federal Courts the principles, pleading and practice of Equity
remain wholly unimpaired, procedure under the Rules now being a complete conquest of the common law by Equity.
The philosophy implicit in this approach raises interesting possibilities. Since 1870, the preservation of the separate courts and systems
in this state has been guaranteed by its constitution,' and shortly
thereafter our Supreme Court said, "... it may be conceded that the
two systems are therein recognized, and it may be further conceded
that the Legislature has no power to abolish either system.""2 Yet,
in the same year, while reiterating that "the courts are to be preserved intact," the same tribunal added, "but what shall be the
1. TENK. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
2. Halsey v. Gaines, 70 Tenn. 316, 319-20 (1879).
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matter over which they shall exercise their powers subject to certain
limitations involved in other clauses of the Constitution, is left to legislative discretion."'3 We can, therefore, short of a constitutional amendment, never have the twin streams of justice flowing from a single
fountain head which exist in many states; but if the course of historical development which has prevailed in the past continues in the
future, we may see the Chancery Courts become dominant in our
judicial system to the point where the Circuit Courts become mere
adjuncts dealing only with such matters as come within their concurrent jurisdiction or over which they are given specific statutory
authority. This may well be the ultimate effect of the Act of 1877
enlarging the jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts to "include all civil
causes of action triable in the Circuit Courts, except for injuries to
' '4
person, property or character, involving unliquidated damages.
Of this Act Chancellor Gibson wrote "the far reaching effect of this
statute is hardly yet fully comprehended," and his editor has seen fit
to permit this statement to stand even after eighteen years.
But if we are to have a de facto consolidation of our courts over a
substantial area (even though de jure it is prohibited by the Constitution), then it would appear that procedural reforms are in order.
For the same considerations which have brought to the Chancery side
many substantive innovations have confirmed it in procedures which
by modern standards are in many instances archaic and outmoded.
Trial "according to the forms of chancery" is a complex and sometimes burdensome process, beset by many pitfalls for the unwary.
"Equity pleading" as our author says, "is a controversial science."
Technical requirements persist which have long since lost their
meaning. For example, how many sworn answers are called for today?
Yet the useless gesture of waiver is demanded for each case. Again,
how many cases are tried on depositions in modern Chancery practice?
Yet, to quote again in a different context, "it seems that by oversight or
neglect it is still quite possible to have such a hearing in Chancery
that will be considered irregular by the appellate courts." This would
appear to be out of step with the modern trend of procedural reform,
which is to protect the unwary. While this approach may tend to encourage slovenly practice, at least it prevents the client from being
penalized for his lawyer's mistakes.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the rules governing
the practice in our Chancery Courts5 have remained virtually unchanged over the past quarter of a century; and even they do little
more than embody the traditional procedures which antedated them
3. Jackson v. Nimmo, 71 Tenn. 597, 609 (1880).

VI, § 8.

4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-602 (1956).
5. Id. § 21-401.

See also TENN. CONST. art.
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by many years. The present editor has found that on matters of
pleading, for example, the authorities cited by Chancellor Gibson in
1891 are as much in point as ever, and has therefore repeated the
citations although the books themselves are long out of print. (Vol. I,
p. 179 n. 13). "The pleadings in Equity were probably borrowed,"
he writes, "from the Civil law (Roman Law) or from the Canon
law (the Civil law as adapted to its own use by the Roman Church
after the fall of Rome), or from- both. The early Chancellors were,
for the most part, if not altogether, ecclesiastics, and many of them
were masters of the jurisprudence of the Civil and Canon law; and
it was natural for them, in the administration of their judicial functions in the Court of Chancery, to transfer into that court the modes
of proceeding with which they were trained and most familiar."
Historically, this is very interesting; but unfortunately we do not
in the hustle and bustle of modern life have the leisure to muse over
it as did our predecessors. If the business of the courts is to be
handled with dispatch, tradition must give way to expedition.
And so the lawyer who seeks equity frequently finds himself
in a procedural morass from which he can extricate himself only
with the greatest difficulty and the aid of a treatise such as this. Reform will come, no doubt; for to quote one of the maxims of which
Chancellor Gibson was so fond, "Apices juris non sunt jura," legal
niceties are not the law, but frequently an impediment to it. Meanwhile in evaluating this new edition of Gibson's Suits in Chancery,
there is no reason to alter the judgment passed upon it almost half a
century ago by an anonymous reviewer:
The volume was promptly accepted according to its real worth as an
authority, has continued to hold its rank, and has become, more than a
mere convenience, an absolute necessity to every Tennessee lawyer.
WALTER P. ARmsTRONG, JR.*

LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT
IN AmERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901. By Sidney Fine. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. x, 468. $7.50.
Doubtless only members of Justice Holmes' own generation ever
could quite recapture the devastation and delight of his quip: "The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics."' That was indeed a judicial milestone, yet just how much has
*Member, Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden and Goodman, Memphis,
Tenn.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting).
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today become obscure. The quoted title, Social Statics, is suggestive.
The pilloried decisions-which at that date were still largely in the
state courts, and were typified by In re Jacobs,2 invalidating a statute
that had outlawed cigar making in tenement houses-are clear enough.
But even a student who recently has reread Spencer can hardly conceive the hold which that preposterous philosopher's ideas had on the
post-Civil War generation. For this reason and others, Professor Fine's
admirable study is timely, welcome aid.
From the very beginning, Fine shows, laissez faire, an individualist
doctrine-the philosophy of the negative state, of "the less government
the better"-held a powerful, innate appeal in a land of virgin resources and opportunity. Yet early practice tempered theory: during
the formative periods, Federalist-Whigs and Democrats alike made
affirmative use of government. In the federal field, there was the
American system, with its tariff, National Road, canal and telegraph
projects; in the states, a host of state-built or state-subsidized canals
and railroads, sanctioned by both parties. The Civil War vastly extended the promotive force and hand of government, bringing increased tariffs, national banks, the nationally subsidized Pacific railroad and telegraph, and the like.
On to this dynamic national stage, about 1865-a nation fast being
urbanized, industrialized, and bereft of free lands-moved Mr. Herbert
Spencer with his Social Statics, Man Versus the State, and Synthetic
Philosophy. Certainly it was one of the fateful, one of the untimeliest
entrances of history. Spencer viewed government as sheer, unmitigated evil. History, happily for him-until disillusionment in old agewas a progression from more government to less! Evolution was the
key, and evolution was inexorable, mechanical, ruthless, yet overall,
benign. Society moved wholly by laws-"natural" laws that is-the
two most vital of which were "the law of equal freedom," and the "law
of conduct and consequence." The former proclaimed simply the platitude that "every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he
infringes not on the equal freedom of any other man." The latter held
that conduct and consequence always were inseparably linked; that
human evolution also must proceed according to the "survival of the
fittest." All in all-and it all was elaborated at great length-here was
one of the fantasies and paradoxes of history: synthetic, deductive
philosophy masquerading as inductive; pure dogma and speculation
decked out as science, and making its appeal as science. Darwinism in
social and civil dress! Yet this creed, preposterous today, possessed an
almost irresistible appeal-a kind of intellectualized, 19th Century
"rock and roll" that literally swept the land. Novelty and will-tobelieve overcame doubt, hypnotized thought, sterilized, neutralized
2. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
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and emasculated government-government to which there was no
human alternative, and which presently was to be needed as never
before.
Hence Spencerism was the windfall of all time. Fortuitously, and
almost at the moment of its birth, a rampant, capitalist order, in good
part created by affirmative action and expansion of government, fell
heir to this shield and buckler-an entire suit of doctrinal armor-as
incongruous as Lochinvar's, to be sure, yet not less valued nor serviceable. Progress, Spencer and his followers contended, was automatic,
certain, irresistible. Government, legislation-"state interference,"
the latter was called-not only were bad; they constituted a dangerous,
unwarranted meddling with the cosmic order. "Hands off," "laissez
faire," "let alone" were commands of nature, the highest wisdom. "Oh,
those grand, immutable, all-wise laws of natural forces," the ironmaster Andrew Carnegie exulted, "how perfectly they work if human
legislators would let them alone! But no, they must be tinkering."
(p. 103) "The universal law of supply and demand," another leader declared, "is superior to any law which can be enacted by Congress or
by any other power on earth." (p. 103).
Professor Fine elaborately documents the conquests of this amazing
creed. Anachronistic it might be-myth masquerading as fact, belief
as thought-yet for a time Spencer's theory literally swept the board.
Economists, businessmen, clergymen, editors, judges-the literate and
knowledgeable professions-all were seduced, all lent their voices to
popularizing a theory which, in its ruthless determinism, dogmatism,
and postulate of a preordained economic and social order, actually was
a kind of inverted Marxism-equally crass, blind and deductive. William Graham Sumner was the American' high priest. Youmans and
his PopularScience Monthly, was its chief propagandist and popularizer, while the Nation, America's leading journal of opinion, and John
W. Burgess, the most influential political scientist, were among its
representative communicants and sponsors.
Inevitably, law became infected. In a forty-page chapter, "Laissez
Faire Becomes the Law of the Land," Fine covers the familiar high
spots of constitutional history, 1870-1900, stressing the importance of
the Cooley, Dillon and Tiedman commentaries; the substantive revolution in due process; the significance of Bradley's and Field's dissents;
the growing voice and influence of the corporate bar. This perhaps is
Fine's least successful chapter. Lawyers and judges will cavil at the
tyrannies of a binary code which reduces every constitutional question to simple affirmation or negation of power or right; and violence
is done to economics, if not to semantics, by failing to emphasize
differences between the judicial veto of subsidy measures or tax exemptions on the one hand, and regulatory measures on the other. Yet
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this chapter is a succinct summary, for general readers, not only of
the leading cases, but of the research and conclusions of Professors
Corwin and Haines as well as the more recent monographs of Twiss,
Jacobs and others.
An added merit of Professor Fine's work is his demonstration that
not all Americans knelt at this altar, and even those who did, including
several of the most devout, like Andrew Carnegie and the future
Justice Sutherland, occasionally, even flagrantly, sinned against their
creed. For laissez faire, as Sumner himself admitted, was a "maxim
of policy ... not a rule of science." (p. 88). Most conveniently, it could
be turned on or off, and it was. There was scarcely a reputable economist in the land, but who believed tariffs to be uneconomic, pernicious
and doomed. Yet these "iniquities" not only survived but flourished,
and much as they deplored "tinkering," ironmasters of Pittsburgh saw
nothing incongruous nor unbeneficial. Carnegie, moreover, eventually
devoted 40 millions of his fortune to founding public libraries on a
matched fund basis-in the end immensely expanding municipal functions.3 And much as he deplored "tinkering," he still could advocate
government construction of a ship canal which promised to lower
ton-mile rates from the lakes to his works in Pittsburgh. Equally
doctrinaire Spencerians clamored for city water works and sewage
systems, and for better state universities for their children. To quote
one of Professor Fine's summaries:
The National Association of Manufacturers, organized in 1895, criticized
the manufacture and free distribution to farmers by the Department of
Agriculture of vaccine designed to combat blackleg but importuned the
federal government to promote foreign trade by chartering an international
American bank, subsidizing the merchant marine, enacting a protective
tariff, and reforming the consular service so as to make it more solicitous
of the export needs of American manufacturers. Railway officials who
attacked rate-making as an improper exercise of legislative authority saw
nothing amiss in legislation to prevent strikes .... (p. 112).
(One here is reminded of, and perhaps there is ironists' symbolism
in, Paschal's vignette of the young Utah Congressman, George Sutherland, defending his beet-growing constituents, and their sugar bounties, against a proposed Cuban reciprocity clause. The Cuban growers'
troubles, Sutherland declared, in opposing the 20% tariff reduction,
sprang from the fact that they were submarginal, inefficient producers!
"It did not occur to him that the same might be said of American producers." 4).
3. See CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEw YORK, CARNEGIE GRANTS FOR LIBRARY
BUILDINGS, 1890-1917, at 3 (1943). "Mr. Carnegie never gave libraries. He gave
money for erection of free public library buildings. The recipient community,
before receiving the gift, was required to pass an ordinance guaranteeing from
tax sources an amount of support equal to one-tenth of the Carnegie gift."
4. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 43 (1951).
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Yet the most significant exposure of this growing breach between
theory and practice probably was Frederic J. Stimson's analysis of
a nine percent sample of the 13,000 laws of all types enacted by the
states and territories in 1889 and 1890-the very years that marked the
rise of broadened judicial restraint via the due process clause. Only
17 of the nearly 1200 acts embodied notions of individualism. By
Stimson's view, 29% were "socialistic" in that they "limited personal
and civic freedom in some essential, and he placed the remainder
in the category of 'allowable socialism' because they recognized the
right of private property although they regulated its use." (p. 353).5
Five years earlier Albert Shaw had declared, "'the one striking and
common characteristic' of the five thousand general laws or amendments . . . enacted by state legislatures in 1885 was their 'utter disregard of the laissez faire principle.'" (p. 353). During the period
1881-1896, New York state expenditures increased four times as much
as the increase in the state's population.
Thus the paradox of these times was the growing gulf between
theory and practice with respect to the responsibilities and functions
of the state. All civilized governments were steadily increasing the
scope of their activities. Yet the dominant social theory-laissez faireignored the trend and the necessity, and condemned the result. Theory
and fact were irreconcilably at odds and moving toward head-on collision.
In the second half of his study Professor Fine develops this reverse
side of the picture. To a degree, of course, Spencer became his own
corrective. Clergymen in the American social gospel movement excoriated his "gospel of force and muscle." A new school of political
economy, more realistic in its premises, and led by Ely, Henry Carter
Adams, Seligman, Commons, Patten, John Bates Clark and others,
stressed the necessity and uses of government to combat such problems of an industrial age as monopoly and unemployment, and to
promote the general welfare by social planning, conservation, and the
like. A new school of sociologists led by Lester Ward, Ross, Small
and Giddings; political scientists like Woodrow Wilson and Westel
Willoughby; pragmatists in philosophy like James and Dewey-all in
varying degrees attacked, exposed, and eroded the premises and precepts of social Darwinism. Meanwhile, reform and reformers-men
like Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and Henry D. Lloyd; movements
like the Grangers and Greenbackers, Free Silverites, Knights of Labor,
Socialists, anti-monopolists-all advanced programs and panaceas
based on the positive uses of government, a theory and program
squarely at odds with Spencerism.
Fine stresses the current and future significance of this shift by
5.

The author here cites SIMPsoN,

POPULAR LAW MAKING 127

(1910).
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analyzing the change in public attitude toward unemployment, as
cherished theories simply dissolved in the face of stubborn facts. His
concluding chapters are models of persuasion. One, "The Legislative
Record," surveys the rise of social and economic legislation, both welfare and regulatory, spelling out the statistical analysis already cited.
This is followed by a brief "Conclusion: The Years Since 1901," which
draws threads together, nudges the impatient Progressives and New
Dealers on stage; then, with artistic restraint, steps aside, allowing
readers to interpolate the trends from their own experience.
Professor Fine thus re-covers, much more intensively and systematically, the field pioneered by Professor Hofstadter's interpretive
essay, Social Darwinism in American Thought.6 The two works necessarily overlap; yet Fine's is far more than elaboration of the Hofstadter
theme. Documentation throughout is meticulous, supported by a
forty-page classed bibliography, outstanding in itself, and of almost
equal value to students of intellectual, economic and constitutional
history.
As an historian of economic and sociological thought, Fine's summaries are strongest in these fields. With his gift for incisive statement
and analysis, one regrets merely that one of the most unfortunate aspects of Sumner's thought is ignored: the manner in which an exaggeration or apotheosis of the role of social mores or "folkways," with
corresponding disparagement of legislation as a creative and positive
element in social control, made for paralysis and regression in such
fields as race relations and the constitutional rights of minorities. The
role of due process (and "higher law" with an economic content), in
constitutionally and judicially shielding business, has been stressed
again and again. Yet the role of Sumner's pseudo-science of the mores,
in ruthlessly abandoning the freedmen, and as an alibi for inertia and
indifference in the face of discriminations, is one phase of Social
Darwinism in its relation to law which deserves greater emphasisespecially now that the deadlock is being broken. Yet even this is
implicit in Fine's study.
In summary, this is a persuasive and enlightening book.
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM:"

*Staff member, Los Angeles County Law Library.
6. (Rev. ed. 1955).

